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Today migration policies are strongly shaped by concerns about current new immigration and scenarios of future mass movements into the wealthy states of Western Europe. In this report I will only deal marginally with the size, the composition, and the regulation of immigration. However, policy developments in the area of integration cannot be fully understood without taking into account this background. A few remarks seem therefore necessary to sketch out the link between immigration and integration.

Some trends which have led to increasing mobility of populations across borders of nation-states are of a long term or even secular nature, others are more recent developments:

Ever since the European industrial revolutions of the 18th and 19th century economic modernization has meant a dramatic increase in individual territorial mobility. From its very beginnings the transition from agrarian to industrial societies was accompanied by global migratory systems of labour recruitment and refugee flows. Developments that have been labelled 'post-industrial' such as the expansion of employment in the tertiary sector have accelerated rather than slowed down this trend.

The development of global information networks has helped to dismantle cognitive boundaries of societies. Individuals now can and do compare their situation not only with that of privileged social strata within their own states but with that of majority populations in other countries. This globalization of information has increased the relative attractiveness of the exit option compared with those of striving for individual upward mobility or struggling for political changes in one's society of birth. The same international channels of information can also be used to acquire practical knowledge about opportunities to reach potential migration targets.

While the information revolution has taken off in the second half of this century the transportation revolution has been unfolding in several steps since about 200 years. Ever cheaper air fares are the most recent achievement after the introduction of steam ships and railroads in the last century and the mass use of automobiles in the 20th.

Many Western European states have actively recruited migrant labour during the boom years after the Second World War. This immigration which was mostly meant to be only temporary has turned out to be permanent. It has led to the definite settlement of a large number of populations of foreign origins and to ongoing chain migrations ranging from family reunification to much wider migratory networks linking communities in sending and receiving countries.

The fall of the Iron Curtain and the dismantling of the international Cold War order has lifted a political brake on emigration in Eastern and Central Europe. At the same time transition to market economies and stable democracies in former Communist societies has turned out to be a process fraught with difficulties and dilemmas. Relative emigration pressure has increased as large parts of populations have not yet felt substantial material improvements. In some regions political turmoil has additionally increased the propensity of certain groups (especially vulnerable ethnic minorities) to emigrate or seek refuge abroad.

At the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean a combination of accelerated demographic growth and economic stagnation has built up a huge emigration potential. Political instability throughout this area might trigger yet unknown dimensions of mass flight and emigration. Established chain migrations, especially from the Maghreb countries to France, Belgium and the Netherlands pave the way for future flows. Italy and Spain have already become targets for new migrations which largely develop as irregular ones and increasingly involve countries of the Sub-saharan region.

Given all these factors of acceleration the real puzzle is why migratory movements have not been much larger. There are two major causes which tend to restrain migratory movements to a level far below the one that could be expected in economic models with free flow of labour :

Most individuals do not behave as purely economic opportunity seekers. Cultural, social and political ties in societies of birth and of long term residence inhibit the movement of labour across international borders. Those who would be inclined to go strongly depend on social networks in the receiving countries which help them to get there, to find first accommodation and to enter the job market. Migrants rarely set out on their journey as economic explorers of a totally unknown territory where there is nobody to help them along. More paradoxically, for many individuals it is even their participation in a transnational migration network which makes them stay in their country of origin. Thus migrant families frequently pool their resources so that members working abroad contribute to the ability of their relatives back home to stay there and maintain a household to which the former can eventually return (see Stark 1991, especially part II and part V). For better understanding migratory flows it is important to add a micro-economic and a sociological perspective to the prevailing macro-economic and demographic ones.

While migratory potentials are largely determined by push and pull factors, actual migratory flows are strongly regulated by state control. Therefore, political science analyses of forces shaping policies at the national and transnational level will have to be integrated with the approaches just mentioned. Receiving states have never accepted that migration can be a safety valve for the social and political problems of sending states and have always used different means to adapt the size and composition of migration to their own needs. Increasing emigration pressure has led to a general response of Western European governments of imposing new visa requirements, enforcing border controls, combatting illegal immigration and of separating admission procedures for refugee and labour migration. Immigration quota which have been traditionally used only in overseas countries are now on the political agenda in some European countries and have already been introduced in Italy and Austria. While in the 60s and 70s liberal European immigration policies were shaped by substantial labour demand and a willingness to accommodate refugees from Communist states for political reasons, today it is concerns about unemployment and housing shortage and about international and internal security which predominate. On the other hand, there is an increasing demand for immigrants with specific skills (Salt 1993, p.20f.).

The current public debate about immigration cannot be sufficiently understood by looking at the actual potentials and flows. Often it is internal developments in receiving states which have changed public perceptions of the problem and political responses. Migration is usually not the main cause of social and political crises which for it held responsible.

Today, migration is often blamed to be responsible for financial difficulties in sustaining generous public welfare arrangements which had been introduced during the 1960s and 1970s. As the assistance given to them is highly visible, asylum seekers and refugees are often seen as a particularly heavy burden on the welfare state. However, labour immigration in Western Europe was both an effect of, and a contributing factor to, the post-war boom and the development of welfare states. Migrant workers generally contribute more to social budgets than they receive in terms of benefits. This is only marginally due to legal discrimination in social rights but results mainly from their demographic composition, i.e. their higher shares of economically active male populations. In Western European societies the secular trends of rising life expectancy and declining birth rates will increase dependency ratios and lead to strains in social security arrangements around 2025 when the baby boom generation enters retirement. It might seem a plausible answer to let further immigration fill this demographic gap. However, most experts agree today that this is not a feasible strategy. Immigration may be needed to overcome shortages in specific sectors of employment but it cannot compensate for the long term trend of ageing of Western societies. The amount of immigration needed to compensate for demographic imbalances would probably be politically unacceptable in most Western countries (Lesthaeghe, Page and Surkyn 1991, Salt 1993, p.14). Immigrant workers settle down and get older, too. They acquire entitlements to social security benefits and old age pensions which add to those of the native work force. High fertility rates among certain groups usually adapt to the native level after one generation. Furthermore, temporary high fertility rates among immigrants have been mostly perceived as a problem rather than a solution. Family allowances are the only branch of social policy where benefits for immigrants are generally higher than their contributions.

Another area where immigrants have been blamed for a crisis of the welfare state although its roots are clearly endogenous ones is unemployment. Legal as well as irregular immigrants mostly work in highly segmented and hierarchical labour markets. In contrast with traditional immigration countries, even intergenerational upward mobility remains very low in Western Europe. Furthermore, the high degree of unionization in core sectors means that wages have been well protected against downward pressure which under given economic conditions has contributed to unemployment more than increasing labour supply through immigration. Immigrants have therefore rarely competed with native workers for scarce jobs. However, there has been rising unemployment among immigrants themselves because of their high concentration in especially vulnerable industries such as textiles. In the public perception endorsed by many politicians all this has been often reduced to a simplistic view that immigration causes more unemployment.

Immigrants have not only been seen as economic agents but also as people of foreign origins and carriers of alien cultures who are unable, or unwilling, to assimilate. Increasing cultural heterogeneity has, however, also been the result of a much more general reassertion of particular collective identities and cultural group rights within Western nation states. The cultural boundaries of national communities have increasingly eroded over a long time but now are often aggressively reasserted against those who are perceived as the most alien groups within a state.

In some countries neo-populist and extreme right wing movements have made inroads into the established party systems. An immigration stop and repatriation policies are usually high on their agenda. Government parties have often reacted in an ambivalent manner by trying to buy off some electoral support from these new right wing movements.

Ongoing migratory flows and the integration of immigrants in host societies are obviously closely interconnected issues but the link between them is complex. A comprehensive theory of integration should avoid too simple answers by taking into account the following four contradictory hypotheses. The paradoxes implied in asserting all four should be removed by defining the specific contexts of their validity, which is far beyond the scope of this report:

Generous and successful integration programmes will quite obviously operate as a pull factor for further immigration. This does not mean that migrants pick out the country with the best social welfare arrangements and the most liberal rules for entry and residence. For new and individual labour migration the single most important factor determining immigration decision is the availability of jobs. However, asylum seekers will certainly choose a state of destination where they have better chances to be recognized or to be allowed to stay even after their applications have been turned down. The geographical targets in family reunification migration will not be influenced by integration policies but the actualization of this migratory potential into a flow will be strongly influenced by integration policies in the field of education, housing and access to employment for dependents.

Since the stop of organized recruitment of migrant labour in 1973-1975 European governments have frequently argued that curbing further immigration would help to consolidate and integrate the resident foreign population. There are diminishing job opportunities for newcomers but also for the second and third generations of immigrant origins in the sectors where migrant workers are concentrated. The situation is even worse in housing markets where supply is much less flexible in adjusting to short term increase of demand. Rapid inflows into already declining urban areas have led to a combination of overcrowding, deteriorating quality and rising prices in accommodation for both old and new immigrants. Thirdly, it has also been argued that continuous new inflows prevent the cultural assimilation of previous waves.

The social integration of new immigrants will be considerably facilitated where they can rely on previous immigrants to assist them, be it members of their own families, of their villages or of a broader ethnic community. Established communities of immigrant origin are also interested in keeping borders relatively open for further immigration from the same origin (1). This helps them to go back and forth or to bring in their family. Immigration restrictions will also generally fire back on long term resident immigrants. Legal regulations often are not specifically targeted exclusively towards new arrivals but more generally towards foreign citizen (2). Regular migrants from 'visible minorities' become the target of police controls intended to uncover irregular immigrants at borders and inside the country. Even when their legal status is not affected, long term residents and also naturalised immigrants may experience increasing popular hostility and social discrimination when immigration laws are tightened. Blaming immigration for social problems frequently leads to blaming also those who have come long time ago.

Free movement within nation-states has been made possible by creating a common framework of citizenship rights that do not depend on local residence. In a similar way free movement for European Union citizens in the whole area of the Union is supported by roughly similar levels of citizenship rights in all member states and by arrangements which make sure that migrants are treated equally with national citizens in civil and social rights and that they can transfer social security benefits to other countries. Ongoing migrations between other states have also led to a large number of bilateral agreements about such transfers and about a mutual granting of specific rights for each other's citizens according to a rule of reciprocity. Between states with very different levels of social welfare arrangements and unidirectional migration flows, a rule of reciprocity cannot cover the most important rights.

However, where migration has been based on active recruitment or has developed for a long time, as is the case with immigration from Turkey, the former Yugoslavia and the Maghreb states, a number of bilateral agreements have been concluded in order to guarantee equal treatment of immigrants with national citizens with regard to most social rights. In addition to this, international conventions have also been used as instruments to equalise social rights and improve security of residence of immigrants.

These forms of extending citizenship rights to transnational levels allow states to open their borders for immigration from certain origins without fear that this will erode their achievements of social protection and their standards of civil rights. While regional integration of this sort facilitates migration it also facilitates remigration. Forced emigration as well as permanent settlement induced by a lack of protection or opportunities when returning can be prevented. Migration is thus reduced to voluntary movement.

Governments and public opinion in highly industrialized immigration countries have become more aware that migration policies must go beyond border controls and internal or regional integration. They must address root causes of involuntary emigration in the sending areas. Until now this insight has not lead to corresponding action. But even if it did, successful industrial development in these countries would probably lead to increasing outmigration during a first phase (Teitelbaum 1993). If they are meant to contribute to sustainable development investment programmes and economic assistance cannot be conceived as paying a ransom in order to remain unmolested with further immigration.

Europeans should know from their own history in the 19th century that industrialisation led to huge waves of emigration and that the availability of receiving countries overseas helped to readjust demographic, social and economic development in the longer run. There will be no New Worlds for tomorrow's emigrants but any strategy of economic development in the South has to leave some doors open in the North. One of the most important contributions towards reducing emigration pressure would be a policy of encouraging democratisation and respect for human rights in potential sending areas. However, in a world of sovereign nation-states possibilities of influencing political developments from outside are more limited than in the economic field.

Democratic industrialised states will therefore also have to keep a door open for those fleeing from political persecution, wars and civil wars or other human made catastrophes. A global integration policy in this sense will be incompatible with ever tighter restrictions on both economic and refugee migrations. A comprehensive theory of integration would have to avoid too simple answers by taking into account all four hypotheses and removing the contradictions by defining the specific contexts of their validity.

1) In the USA the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 which aimed at curbing illegal inflows mainly from Mexico was strongly opposed by the established Latino minorities although according to the second hypothesis stopping this new immigration should have been primarily in their own interest.

2) The new Austrian Law on the Residence of Foreigners (Aufenthaltsgesetz) provides a good illustration for this. It was meant to be an instrument for controlling and reducing new immigration but has in fact increased the legal insecurity about their residence rights among long established immigrants.

_Quelle www.social.coe.int/en/index.htm

WASHINGTON (AP) - U.S. immigrants who arrived in the 1980s remained poorer, were less likely to own homes and less apt to become citizens than those who came in the previous three decades, according to a study by a group calling for tougher immigration controls.

A key reason for the difference is that education levels of arriving immigrants have not kept pace with those of native-born Americans, the group said.

"In an economy that increasingly rewards educated workers ... it is no surprise that many immigrants are finding it increasingly difficult to join the economic mainstream," said the study being released Wednesday by the Washington-based Center for Immigration Studies.

Steven Camarota, the center's research director, said the data show immigration policies should be changed to reduce entry of unskilled immigrants, eliminate preferences for spouses and children of non-citizens, stem employment of illegal immigrants, and help immigrants obtain job skills and become citizens more quickly.

But Frank Sharry, National Immigration Forum executive director, said it's unfair to compare today's immigrants to those of the 1950s and 1960s, when the United States had a "racialized" policy favoring Europeans who generally had more educational opportunities in their native countries. He said today's immigrants - mainly from Mexico, Central America and Asia - are comparable to those who arrived in the early 1900s.

"If America does the right things to help today's low-income new arrivals, they will also be tomorrow's firmly established middle class," Sharry said.

Camarota's study looked at four decades of Census data to track the progress immigrants made after living in the country 11 to 20 years. The progress of 1950s arrivals was reflected in 1970 data, 1960s arrivals in data from 1980 and so on.

"Since 1970, each immigration group has done worse than the other," Camarota said.

"It's going to be hard for those 11 million to close the gap. We know they look very much like 1980s immigrants, and looking back at 1980s immigrants in 2000, they've lagged very far behind," he said.

The study used three criteria to measure progress: home ownership, citizenship and poverty rates. Among the findings:

- The poverty rate for immigrants who arrived in the 1950s and had lived in the country at least 11 years was 25.7 percent, compared with 35.1 percent for native-born Americans. By the 1980s, the number of immigrants living in poverty had grown to 41.4 percent, while native Americans fell to 28.8 percent.

- Home ownership among 1950s immigrants was 56.8 percent in 1970, compared with 63.4 percent of natives. But among '80s immigrants, only 45.5 percent owned homes in 2000, compared to 69.5 percent of natives.

- Almost 64 percent of '50s immigrants were citizens by 1970, compared with only 38.9 percent of '80s immigrants in 2000.

- More immigrants are getting high school diplomas - 67 percent in 2000 compared to 50 percent in 1970 - but the percentage remains far below the nearly 91 percent graduation rate among native-born Americans.

Wendy Zimmermann, a senior research associate with the Urban Institute, a Washington-based economic and social policy think tank, criticized the study for including more than legal immigrants. She said her organization's research shows legal immigrants who have lived in the country 10 years or more often have incomes exceeding those of native-born Americans.

"I think it points out important trends, but it's not the whole picture," she said of the study. "By lumping legal immigrants and refugees and illegal immigrants, their picture looks very different."

Recent immigrants make less money, own fewer homes and are less likely to become citizens than foreigners who came to the United States in decades past, according to a national study released Wednesday.

The conservative Center for Immigration Studies concludes that the lack of education among the newer waves of immigrants makes moving up the economic ladder and adapting to their new home more difficult.

Previously, immigrants arrived in the United States poor and thrived as they adapted.

But the CIS study contends that newer immigrants are even poorer when they arrive and remain mired in poverty a decade or more after their arrival.

"Over the last 30 years, each consecutive wave of immigrants has done worse than the one that preceded it," the study said.

Steven Camarota, the study's author, argues that the country needs to restrict immigration and make sure that more of the immigrants are skilled.

"It doesn't surprise me that immigrants are not faring as well as they used to," said University of Houston professor Jacqueline Hagan, who said she had not yet read the CIS report.

The questions of home ownership and citizenship may not be as relevant as they used to be, Hagan argued, since so many immigrants go back and forth between two countries - a process known as transnationalism.

"For many of these immigrants, success may mean the ability to build a house back home" in Mexico or Guatemala, she said.

But Camarota argues that when looked at in terms of what is good for America, factors like home ownership and citizenship are important because they indicate a person's commitment to the nation.

He estimates that 18 million people living in the United States are not citizens - enough to fill about 30 congressional districts.

"If immigration is not making new U.S. citizens, that's not necessarily good for the country," he said. "These people can't participate in the political process."

The study did not break the data down by state, but Camarota said previous studies have shown that immigrants in Texas have poverty rates that are even higher than the rest of the nation.

Camarota says there have been inklings that immigrants who arrived in the 1980s have not done as well but said his study offers some of the first long-term data to show that to be the case.

Using data from the Current Population Survey produced by the U.S. Census Bureau, Camarota analyzed data for established immigrants - those who have been in the country 11 to 20 years.

In 1970, 26 percent of established immigrants lived in poverty, which was less than the rate of 35 percent among U.S. natives. Today, 41 percent of established immigrants live in poverty, compared with 29 percent of natives.

Established immigrants have also suffered precipitous declines in rates of home ownership and citizenship.

Rice University Sociologist Stephen Klineberg said his studies of Houston confirm that many immigrants are not doing as well as previous waves of immigrants, something he attributes to an economy that now values knowledge above raw labor.

"The largely uneducated campesinos (peasants) who come here from El Salvador and Mexico work very hard, but they are locked in poverty," Klineberg said. He argued that middle-class Americans benefit from the low-wage work done by those immigrants.

That cycle of poverty could be ended if the United States provides adequate education to the children of those immigrants, Klineberg said.

The immigrants who have been streaming into the country in recent decades are poorer than their predecessors and - to the detriment of the nation - are likely to stay that way.

That's the conclusion of a report that the Center for Immigration Studies released yesterday.

The Center describes itself as a locally headquartered research organization that "examines and critiques the impact of immigration." Its 15-page study is based largely on an analysis of the Census Bureau's newest Current Population Survey - a periodic statistical report produced independently of the Census 2000 data currently being released.

- Slightly more than 41 percent of "established immigrants" live in or "near" poverty, contrasted with 28.8 percent of native-born Americans.

As the study defines it, people who make less than 200 percent of the federal poverty level are "poor or near poor." Using that standard, a family of four would be "near poor" if it earned less than $34,000 yearly.

Thirty years ago, the situation was reversed. Then, just 25.7 percent of the immigrant population and 35.1 percent of the native-born were poor. The Center calculates that 200 percent of the then-prevailing poverty level came to $7,500.

- Almost 46 percent of longtime immigrant house-dwellers own their homes today, contrasted with nearly 70 percent of native households. In 1970, 56.8 percent of immigrants and 63.4 percent of America's native-born owned their residences.

- Just 38.9 percent of immigrants who by last year had lived in the United States between 11 and 20 years have become citizens. In 1970, 63.6 percent of such long-term immigrants were naturalized.

Steven A. Camarota, the Center's research director and author of the study, calls his findings "frightening."

He said the data regarding income, home ownership and citizenship status are especially important because they describe "the extent to which immigrants are being successfully incorporated into the economic and social life of the United States."

Moreover, he says the study's conclusions signal the nation is becoming a place of "native 'haves' and immigrant 'have-nots,' " which has "enormous economic and social consequences."

The National Immigration Forum, an immigrant advocacy group, quickly derided the Center's study. The Forum's Executive Director, Frank Sharry, proclaimed in a statement:

"This publication the Center's study is cut from the same cloth as the pseudo-science of the early 1900s that labeled Italians, Jews, Slovaks and other Europeans as 'unassimilable.' "

Mr. Sharry characterized the Center as an advocate for "severe reductions in immigration" and said the study relies on questionable methodology and distorts facts.

"What the restrictionists don't get is that the hard work and determination of immigrants combined with the enduring power of the American Dream mean that today's struggling newcomers will be tomorrow's established middle-class Americans," he declared.

Mr. Camarota - and other researchers - have noted that the large majority of newcomers to the nation have less education and fewer skills than those who came in earlier decades.

"The decline in the relative education level of immigrants is so important because there is no single better predictor of success in modern America," Mr. Camarota said.

WASHINGTON - The number of immigrants in the United States has tripled in the past 30 years but their relative standard of living has deteriorated, a new study showed Wednesday.

The study by the Center for Immigration Studies concluded immigrants who have lived in the United States for 10 to 20 years were poorer and less likely to be homeowners than U.S. natives. The census puts the number of immigrants at about 30 million.

"Immigrants as a group are far behind natives in terms of home ownership . . . as well as health insurance. Welfare use is much higher," study author Steven Camarota said.

More than 40 percent of immigrants lived at or near the poverty line in 2000, compared with 26 percent in 1970. But while the number of poor immigrants soared, the native population grew wealthier. Just more than 35 percent of natives were classified as poor in 1970, falling to 29 percent by 2000.

The most recent waves of immigrants to the United States have found the American dream more difficult to realize than those who preceded them, according to a study released Wednesday.

The independent Center for Immigration Studies, using US Census Bureau data, found that over recent decades each wave of immigrants has fared worse than the one before.

Looking at today's established immigrants - those who have been in the country for between 10 and 20 years - it found they were poorer, less likely to be homeowners, and less likely to have become citizens than established immigrants in 1950 to 1970.

"Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses," reads the inscription on New York's the Statue of Liberty. That image remains valid today, as in the last three decades newly arrived immigrants have started out poorer than those who arrived in the two decades up to 1970, the study found.

Once in the country, they have not been as successful at using education as a means to improve their situation.

In 2000, more than 34 percent of established immigrants had never completed high-school, while less than 10 percent of those who were born in the country were in the same situation.

In 1970, only seven percentage points had separated established immigrants from natives in this respect.

The study's author, Steve Camarota, said the data on citizenship was worrisome as it without the vote, recent immigrants would remain without political representation.

Although there was a surge in applications for citizenship in the mid-1990s, partly in response to legislative changes in California, there has been a long-term decline in citizenship rates.

In 1970, more than 63 percent of immigrants had become citizens. By 2000, this had declined to a little over 34 percent.

Between 1970 and 2000, the percentage of established immigrant households who owned their own homes declined 11.3 percentage points.

Whereas in 1970, the percentage of immigrants and natives living in or near poverty was almost the same, a gap opened up between the two groups in the decades that followed - although this was partly because of the decline in the percentage of native-born Americans who were poor.

Camarota noted that Hispanic immigrants featured strongly among the poorer, less-educated and non-homeowners. His study did not incorporate the recently released data from the main nationwide Census - which counted a larger than expected number of Hispanics.

If the figures were weighted to take account of the latest Census, the picture would look still gloomier, he said.

Educational attainment is crucial, he said. And "in an economy that increasingly rewards educated workers, while offering only very limited opportunities for those with little education, it is no surprise that many immigrants are finding it increasingly difficult to join the economic mainstream."